

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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P 031553Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4265

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

USMISSION UN PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 THE HAGUE 4319

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, NL

SUBJECT: FONMIN VAN DER STOEL'S VISIT TO ATHENS AUG. 30-31

SUMMARY. FONOFF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DE HOOP SCHEFFER SAW CHARGE SEPTEMBER 2, AS DIRECTED BY FONMIN VAN DER STOEL TO GIVE US DETAILED ACCOUNT OF VAN DER STOEL'S VISIT TO ATHENS. ENTHUSIASTIC AIRPORT WELCOME AND SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC TREATMENT CONSTITUTED, IN DE HOOP SCHEFFER'S TERMS, "PERSONAL POLITICAL SUCCESS" FOR VAN DER STOEL. AS SEEN FROM THE HAGUE, VISIT ALSO ACCOMPLISHED VAN DER STOEL'S AVOWED OBJECTIVE OF HELPING TO ALLEVIATE GOG'S FEELINGS OF ISOLATION AND FRUSTRATION. IN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS VAN DER STOEL'S ELICITED GOG'S IDEAS ON SPECIFIC GESTURES WHICH TURKS COULD MAKE ON GROUND IN CYPRUS WHICH WOULD PUT GOG POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN A POSITION TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. VAN DER STOEL ACCEPTED THE GREEK VIEW THAT IT WAS UP TO THE TURKS TO MAKE SUCH GESTURES TO OFFSET THE NATIONAL HUMILIATION THAT GREECE HAD SUFFERED. VAN DER STOEL AND HIS SMALL PARTY CONFIRMED FIRSTHAND THAT ANTI-AMERICANISM WAS GENERAL AND GROWING THROUGHOUT THE

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POPULATION BUT THEY DID NOT FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE

OPPORTUNE TO RAISE IT IN THEIR OFFICIAL TALKS. VAN DER STOEL'S CONVERSATION AND OBSERVATIONS CONFIRMED HIS EARLIER JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THE TIME BEING NOT TO PUSH THE GREEKS ON THEIR DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MILITARY SIDE OF NATO. THE DUTCH CAME AWAY WITH THE CONVICTION THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM CONTINUES TO BE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE FOR THE GOG, WHICH HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTENDING VIEWS OF ALL SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL TENDENCIES AS WELL AS THE GREEK MILITARY. VAN DER STOEL IS CONVINCED THAT THE SITUATION CALLS FOR ACTIVE PRESSURE BY THE US ON THE GOT TO MAKE THE NECESSARY GESTURES TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED AGAIN. END SUMMARY.

1. ATMOSPHERICS: DE HOOP SCHEFFER BEGAN BY DESCRIBING VAN DER STOEL'S ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION AT THE ATHENS AIRPORT, WHICH SET THE TONE FOR THE WHOLE VISIT. ON HAND WERE A GREAT MANY MINISTERS WHOM VAN DER STOEL HAD KNOWN PRIOR TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE COLONELS PLUS A FEW HUNDRED SHOUTING, EBULLIENT GREEKS, SEVERAL OF THEM WAVING PLACARDS WITH SUC SLOGANS AS "VAN DER STOEL - HERO OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY". HE WAS ALSO PRESENTED WITH SEVERAL BOUQUETS OF FLOWERS. VAN DER STOEL'S OTHER DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE GREEK PEOPLE CAME DURING AN "OPEN HOUSE" AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY ON THE AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 31 WHEN SOME 80 TO 100 GREEKS, MOST OF THEM UNKNOWN TO VAN DER STOEL, CAME TO HONOR HIM AND PAY THEIR RESPECTS. SOME OF THEM BROUGHT PRESENTS. SOME OF THE VISITORS TO THE EMBASSY WERE SELF-SEEKERS, DE HOOP SCHEFFER ACKNOWLEDGED, WHO HAD APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THEIR PERSONAL POSITION OR OBJECTIVES TO BE SEEN WITH VAN DER STOEL ON THIS OCCASION. IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM DE HOOP SCHEFFER'S REMARKS WHETHER HE PUT MELINA MERCOURI AND LADY FLEMING IN THIS CATEGORY. IN SUM, ACCORDING TO DE HOOP SCHEFFER, THE PUBLIC SIDE OF THE VISIT CONSTITUTED A PERSONAL POLITICAL SUCCESS FOR VAN DER STOEL.

2. PROGRAM OF VISIT: THE BUSINESS SIDE OF THE VISIT CONSISTED OF A MEETING WITH PRIMIN CARAMANLIS AND FONMIN MAVROS THE EVENING OF VAN DER STOEL'S ARRIVAL FOLLOWED BY A DINNER BY MAVROS AT WHICH THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE,

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PUBLIC WORKS AND PLANNING WERE ALSO PRESENT. SATURDAY MORNING VAN DER STOEL AND MAVROS AT FIRST MET PRIVATELY AND THEN THE MEETING WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THEIR PRINCIPAL ADVISERS (ON THE DUTCH SIDE DE HOOP SCHEFFER AND FONOFF PRESS SPOKESMAN JAN BREMAN). THERE WAS ALSO SOME BUSINESS TALK AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY THE FINANCE MINISTER SATURDAY EVENING. SATURDAY LUNCHEON WAS AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY AND INCLUDED SEVERAL OF VAN DER STOEL'S

PERSONAL FRIENDS FROM THE GREEK COMMUNITY. THE VISITING PARTY DINED PRIVATELY SATURDAY NIGHT IN A LOCAL RESTAURANT. THE NEXT MORNING THEY FLEW BACK TO THE HAGUE.

3. CYPRUS: VAN DER STOEL'S GAMBIT, ACCORDING TO DE HOOP SCHEFFER, WAS TO ATTEMPT TO FIND OUT WHAT KIND OF PRELIMINARY GESTURE BY THE TURKS WOULD ENABLE THE GREEKS TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. CARAMANLIS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TURKEY'S FIRST ACTION (LANDING TROOPS ON CYPRUS) WAS CAUSED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE PREVIOUS GOG REGIME. CARAMANLIS EXPRESSED STRONG VIEWS, HOWEVER, THAT TURKEY'S "SECOND ACTION" (DELIBERATELY EXTENDING THE AREA ORIGINALLY OCCUPIED BY ITS TROOPS) WAS AIMED AT THE CARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT TO PRESSURE IT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IT WAS THE SECOND TURKISH ACTION, CARAMANLIS SAID, THAT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO GO AHEAD WITH A SUMMIT MEETING WITH BULENT ECEVIT (TO WHICH CARAMANLIS ORIGINALLY HAD NOT BEEN AVERSE). THE GREEK SIDE EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE FREGUEE QUESTION. IN THIS CONTECT THEY INDICATED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT GESTURE THE TURKS COULD MAKE WAS TO ALLOW THE RETURN OF SOME 50,000 GREEK CYPRIOTS TO THE MODERN SECTION OF FAMAGUSTA. THE GREEKS SAID THEY WOULD ALSO LIKE THE TURKS TO REDUCE THEIR PRESENT ZONE OF OCCUPATION. FINALLY, THEY WANTED THE TURKS TO MOVE OUT OF THE SOUTHERN OR SOUTHEASTERN SECTOR OF NICOSIA SO THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD ONCE AGAIN BE GUARANTEED ACCESS TO THE CITY. DE HOOP SCHEFFER CAUTIONED THAT THE LATTER POINT WAS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ONE FOR THE GOG (FOR REASONS WHICH WERE NOT MADE CLEAR), HENCE THE DUTCH WERE PASSING IT ON TO US ON A STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS AND IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT FIGURE IN THE REPORT WHICH THE GON WILL GIVE TO ITS EC-9 PARTNERS.

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4. INTERNAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEMS: THE DUTCH CAME AWAY WITH THE CONVICTION THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM CONTINUED TO BE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE FOR THE GOG, WHICH HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTENDING VIEWS OF ALL SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL TENDENCIES AS WELL AS THE GREEK MILITARY. APROPOS OF THE LATTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE AVEROFF TOLD THE DUTCH PRIVATELY AT THE FINANCE MINISTER'S RECEPTION THAT HE BELIEVED HE HAD THE GREEK MILITARY UNDER CONTROL FOR THE MOMENT. GENERAL IOANNIDES HAD BEEN INDUCED TO RETIRE AND OTHER POTENTIAL TROUBLEMAKERS HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO OUTLYING ISLANDS. NETHERTHELESS, DE HOOP SCHEFFER EMPHASIZED, THE GOG MUST BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN ITS HANDLING OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, ABOUT WHICH ALL GREEKS FELT VERY HUMILIATED. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS

CARAMANLIS HAD SAID PUBLICLY, THAT DID NOT MEAN THAT THE GREEKS WERE FULL OF HATRED FOR THE TURKISH PEOPLE. FURTHERMORE, A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, IN THE DUTCH ASSESSMENT, WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER DEMOCRATIZATION IN GREECE VIA THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS.

5. VAN DER STOEL'S ASSESSMENT OF A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT: DE HOOP SCHEFFER SAID THAT VAN DER STOEL WANTED THE US TO KNOW THAT HIS VISIT HAD CONFIRMED HIS EARLIER JUDGMENT THAT THE SITUATION CALLED FOR ACTIVE PRESSURE BY THE US ON THE GOG, WHICH WAS INDISPENSABLE IN LEADING THE TURKS TO MAKE THE GESTURES DISCUSSED OR SOMETHING COMPARABLE. ONLY THEN WOULD THE GOG BE IN A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITION TO ACCEPT A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

6. NATO AND ANTI-AMERICANISM: THERE WAS NOT MUCH DISCUSSION OF THESE TOPICS PER SE. GREEK LEADERS WERE AWARE THAT ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS WERE GENERAL AND INCREASING THROUGHOUT THE POPULATION. BOTH CARAMANLIS AND MAVROS INDICATED THAT IF THERE WERE A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM THE GOG'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MILITARY SIDE OF NATO COULD BE RECONSIDERED. EVEN IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE DUTCH WERE NOT SURE HOW FAR ATHENS WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO IN

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ACTION SS-30

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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4266

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

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EXDIS

RESUMING MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATO. ON THE BASIS OF THEIR TALKS AND OBSERVATIONS, THE DUTCH CONCLUDED THAT ANTI-AMERICANISM, ALTHOUGH WIDESPREAD AND CERTAINLY NOT A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT, PROBABLY SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE BY CHANNELLING HOSTILE FEELINGS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE DIRECTED AT NATO. VAN DER STOEL FELT THAT IT WAS BEST TO LEAVE THE NATO QUESTION ASIDE FOR THE TIME BEING AND TO REFRAIN FROM PUTTING ANY PRESSURE ON THE GOG.

7. GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH THE EEC AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: THE DUTCH WERE INFORMED THAT A FIRST GENERAL SURVEY OF THE GREEK ECONOMY BY THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND PLANNING INDICATED A GAP OF SOME \$400 MILLION IN GREECE'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN BOTH 1974 AND 1975. THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS THAT THE GOG HAD A KEEN DESIRE TO REACTIVATE ITS ASSOCIATION WITH THE EEC, LEADING EVENTUALLY TO FULL MEMBERSHIP. THERE WAS LIKEWISE GREAT INTEREST IN REJOINING THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. THE GREEK HOSTS REACTED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO DUTCH SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MIGHT SEND AN EXPLORATORY DELEGATION TO ATHENS.

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8. SOVIET PROPOSAL: THE GREEKS INDICATED TO THE DUTCH THAT THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL "FOR THE NEEDS OF THE CAUSE" WITH NO EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD GET ANYWHERE.

9. FINAL IMPRESSIONS AND COMMENTS: IN DE HOOP SCHEFFER'S VIEW, GREECE HAD ALREADY MADE QUITE REMARKABLE PROGRESS ON POLITICAL STABILIZATION, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE STILL PROBLEMS AND RISKS REMAINING. HE REITERATED VAN DER STOEL'S JUDGMENT PRIOR TO THE VISIT THAT THE CARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT WAS THE BEST POSSIBLE ONE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. MANY GREEKS TOLD THE DUTCH THAT THEY HAD BEEN LIBERATED, THAT THEY FELT FREE AGAIN FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS. THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT THEIR DEEP GRATITUDE TO MAX VAN DER STOEL FOR EVERYTHING HE HAD DONE BOTH AS A PARLIAMENTARIAN AND A FOREIGN MINISTER TO HELP RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO GREECE. DE HOOP SCHEFFER CLARIFIED THAT CONTRARY TO ONE OR TWO ERRONEOUS ACCOUNTS OF VAN DER STOEL'S AIRPORT PRESS CONFERENCE, HE HAD NOT BEEN OFFERED TO MEDIATE BUT SIMPLY TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE FROM ONE INTERESTED PARTY TO ANOTHER OR TO BE OF ASSISTANCE IN ANY OTHER WAY DESIRED (IN FACT, THE GREEKS APPARENTLY DID NOT ASK HIM TO TRANSMIT A FORMAL MESSAGE TO THE TURKS). IN CONCLUSION, DE HOOP SCHEFFER SAID THAT THE MINISTER HOPED THAT THE

US WOULD KEEP THE GON INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. THE HAGUE WOULD OF COURSE BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY US COMMENT OR REACTION TO VAN DER STOEL'S IMPRESSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. THE CHARGE SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT OUR AUTHORITIES WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT REACTION THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA GOT TO VAN DER STOEL'S CONSLUSION THAT ONE OR TWO SUBSTANTIVE GESTURES BY THE TURKS WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO BRING THE GREEKS BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

10. COMMENT: IN A MEETING LATER THAT AFTERNOON ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT, VAN DER STOEL CONFIRMED TO THE CHARGE HIS CONVICTION THAT NO USEFUL POINT WOULD BE SERVED BY PUSHING ON NATO AT THIS TIME BUT THAT US PRESSURE ON THE TURKS WAS NEEDED IN ORDER TO INDUCE THE TURKS TO MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS ON THE GROUND IN CYPRUS. THIS
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LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT VAN DER STOEL'S VISIT PROBABLY DID HELP TO ALLEVIATE GOG'S FEELING OF ISOLATION AND FRUSTRATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT VAN DER STOEL'S CONVERSATIONS WILL GIVE PAUSE TO THOSE IN GREECE ABETTING OR TOLERATING ANTI-AMERICANISM. NOR, AS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, DID HE SEE FIT TO SUGGEST TO HIS GREEK INTERLOCUTORS THAT THEY GO SLOWLY IN IMPLEMENTING THEIR DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MILITARY SIDE OF NATO. IN SUM, AS WE SEE IT, VAN DER STOEL MAY HAVE THE EAR AND RESPECT AND ADMIRATION OF THE GOG BUT WHETHER HE IS WILLING OR ABLE TO INFLUENCE ATHENS TOWARD DIFFICULT DECISIONS IS A MOOT QUESTION. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS ALSO A QUESTION OF WHETHER VAN DER STOEL AND THE GON HAVE NOT GONE DOWN ON THE TURKISH SIDE OF THE SCALES DESPITE THEIR EARLIER "TILT" IN FAVOR OF THE TURKISH RIPOSTE TO THE OVERTHROW OF MAKARIOS.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, NEGOTIATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: shawdg
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974THEHA04319
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740243-0765
From: THE HAGUE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740978/aaaacnzi.tel
Line Count: 316
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: shawdg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 MAY 2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <27 FEB 2003 by shawdg>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FONMIN VAN DER STOEL'S VISIT TO ATHENS AUG. 30-31 SUMMARY. FONOFF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DE HOOP
TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, NL, US, ATHENS, (VAN DER STOEL, MAX), (CARAMANLIS), (MAVORIS)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005